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Chapter 6 
Land Markets and their Regulation: The 
Economic Impacts of Planning 
P. Cheshire and W. Vermeulen 
 
NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK: WELFARE ECONOMICS 
VERSUS PLANNING 
The great majority of the world’s population, and all those living in 
developed economies, live in societies in which the goods and services they 
consume are provided through markets and – subject to their incomes – they 
are free to choose what, where, and how much to consume. But to varying 
degrees governments intervene and regulate all markets. So the regulation of 
land markets is not exceptional in itself: but it is exceptional in its form and 
severity. What economists call ‘land market regulation’ however, most 
people – including those who practice it – call land use ‘zoning’ or 
‘planning’. This is definitely a form of regulation, however, since it 
determines the use of an economic resource according to rules and norms: 
prices and land markets are still influential, as we will see below, but their 
influence is constrained and regulated by planning decisions. 
Underlying and guiding the form of most systems of market regulation 
there are general analytical principles derived from welfare economics, which 
build essentially on two ‘fundamental theorems’. The first of these theorems 
is that under certain conditions, the outcomes generated by markets are 
‘efficient’ or ‘socially optimal’. The economic concept of efficiency has a 
very particular meaning; an outcome is socially optimal if no redistribution of 
‘goods’ or re-allocation of resources is possible which would not make at 
least one person worse off in welfare terms than they were previously. In 
other words, taking the real income distribution and legal property rights as 
given, it is impossible to improve total welfare without damaging the welfare 
of at least one individual. The validity of this theorem rests on four principle 
conditions holding, however: the first is that people are the best judges of 
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their own welfare; the second is that the actions of no person or firm 
influence the welfare of others without that influence being reflected in 
prices; the third is that no agent in the system has any degree of monopoly; 
and finally it must be the case that all goods have prices. A violation of any 
one of these conditions is usually referred to as a ‘market failure’. 
The point and power of this result may seem paradoxical to a non-
economist. It is that the conditions that would have to hold for markets to 
deliver a socially optimal outcome almost never hold in practice. But they 
can be identified with complete precision. The beauty of this first 
fundamental theorem of welfare economics is that it provides clear guidelines 
for regulating markets. The best sort of regulation intervenes in ways to 
ensure that so far as possible the conditions leading to market failure are 
eliminated or, more realistically, their influence is minimised. In nearly all 
countries there are government bodies charged with ensuring fair 
competition, regulating monopolistic practices, advising and intervening on 
health aspects of industrial processes, or devising policies to restrict pollution 
or combat global climate change. Some goods – the most obvious being 
national defence – do not have prices and are provided directly by the 
government. All these examples of government intervention or regulation 
reflect clearly identified sources of market failure.  
Economists make a sharp distinction between efficiency – the best society 
can do on the basis of the current distribution of incomes and wealth – and 
what is ‘equitable’, that is, what society might collectively choose as a fairer 
distribution of income and wealth. The advantage of the notion of efficiency 
is that outcomes can be analysed without resorting to ethical judgements 
beyond those identified above. It is the content of the second fundamental 
theorem of welfare economics that whatever its distributional properties, 
every outcome that is efficient can be attained in a market economy by 
transferring money between agents in a lump sum fashion. So if society, for 
example, really prefers an outcome in which every agent is equally well off, 
irrespective of their endowments in terms of human capital, it can attain this 
outcome by transferring money to agents with little human capital and leave 
the allocation of commodities to markets. Nevertheless, this result takes the 
distribution of real incomes again as given, treating the ‘ideal’ distribution as 
a matter of individual conscience and judgement. Economists are of course 
interested in distribution but they are less confident in their analysis. For 
instance, economics has important things to say about the often unexpected 
distributional outcomes of planning interventions (see the section dealing 
with evidence on the effects of land use regulation for some examples) but it 
has little to say about what those distributional outcomes should be. 
Economics contributes a great deal to the analysis of issues such as the 
affordability of housing, exclusionary zoning or social housing but it has little 
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to say about the necessity or desirability of the distributional purposes of such 
policies. 
To most planners, welfare economics is an alien way of thinking, as they 
tend to come from a completely different intellectual tradition. Economists 
are rational, calculating and – aspirationally at least – the closest in approach 
to natural science of any social science. Planning’s roots are in design and 
engineering and its aspirations are utopian. Hall (1974) in his wonderful 
overview of the historical origins of planning, devotes a whole chapter to 
‘The Seers’. The founder of the Council for the Preservation of Rural 
England (in 1925) was Abercrombie, the author of the seminal 1944 plan for 
Greater London. Another influential figure in the early days of planning was 
the eccentric architect of Portmeirion, Clough William-Ellis (1928). Planning 
has added a good deal of social science over the past generation and is now 
an established, legalised and legalistic system, but its intellectual roots are in 
design and what draws eager students into the subject is an aspiration to 
improve the lot of human kind by means of a better built environment. 
Ultimately, for many in the planning profession, ‘urban containment’ and 
‘mixed development’ are worthwhile because they regard them as right: or at 
least that is how it seems to be to an economist looking in to the world of 
planning. 
Another essential distinction is that while planners treat aesthetics and 
amenities as having intrinsic value, economists attempt to value these 
attributes in terms of how they influence human welfare, reflected in what 
people are willing to pay for them. For instance, environmentalists appear to 
economists to set some absolute value on environmental outcomes, 
independently of human preferences. Economists try to estimate the 
willingness to pay for environmental outcomes. Planners favour mixed land 
uses and mixed communities. Economists ask awkward questions, like what 
is the value of such attributes? Who gains from them? Who loses? And how 
much do they cost to secure? All these issues can be treated within the 
framework of welfare economics, which puts sustainability and 
environmental outcomes, including those of the built environment and its 
relationship to rural preservation or conservation, to the same fundamental 
tests: costs and benefits. They are not outcomes given value in their own 
right, but their value depends on the preferences and willingness of people to 
pay for them and what we have collectively to forego in order to obtain them. 
This chapter offers a welfare economic perspective on land use regulation 
that is accessible to planners. Our aim is to persuade planners of the value 
this perspective has. In the next section, we will discuss the reasons for land 
use regulation in terms of various types of market failure. The following 
section illustrates how economic theory may be employed to derive optimal 
land use policies that take account of externalities and the public nature of 
certain types of land use, while offering some thoughts on the applicability of 
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these theoretical results in the real world. Next, empirical evidence on costs 
and benefits of land use regulation is considered. As land use regulation is 
relevant for other sectors too, and as there may be indirect effects of these 
policies, our concluding section puts this discussion into a wider perspective.  
 
WHY IS INTERVENTION IN URBAN LAND MARKETS 
NEEDED?  
How exactly does the rather general framework of welfare economics apply 
to land markets and cities? Land markets are riddled with problems of market 
failure, particularly those associated with actions of land owners that are not 
priced and the provision of specialised public ‘goods’, such as open space, 
which it is difficult or impossible to price. An obvious feature of land is that 
any parcel has a specific and fixed location. The value of any parcel of land 
is, moreover, largely determined by the characteristics and uses of other 
parcels of land bordering it and to which it gives access. A plot of land in 
central London may be worth £100 million a hectare, not because of its 
fertility but because it gives easy access to one of the largest, most highly 
skilled and highest paying labour markets in the world and large numbers of 
high spending customers. If it is close to a parcel of land being used as a 
major intersection of the Tube system its value will be substantially greater 
because access will be even easier. If a firm were to set up on the adjoining 
plot, smelting lead or incinerating toxic waste, the value of the site would be 
greatly reduced. Houses under a flight path at Heathrow airport will be worth 
less than similar houses not affected by aircraft noise. A house in a National 
Park and with a view out over its unspoilt beauty or with frontage to a good 
fishing or boating river will equally have a substantially higher price than a 
similar house looking out to a railway line or a power station. There is an 
extensive literature documenting the extent, complexity and sophistication of 
the ways in which land and housing markets capitalise the impact of 
amenities, neighbourhood characteristics and disamenities to which their 
location exposes them. As far as it concerns the valuation of open space and 
other planning-induced amenities, a brief review of this literature is offered in 
the section dealing with evidence on the effects of land use regulation. 
But while the value of any given site depends on the uses of sites 
bordering it and to which it gives access, the actions of the owners of those 
other related sites which generate (or reduce) that value would, in 
unregulated markets, be neither rewarded not penalised; or at least only 
incompletely. The firm that decides to set up a lead smelting plant may lose 
value in its own site but does not (at least without regulation) have to 
compensate the owners of the other surrounding sites for the losses they 
incur. A farmer who pollutes a river would lose the value of his own fishing 
rights but not the value of all those down river who also suffered loss. These 
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are all examples of externalities, and because land values are so strongly 
influenced by the actions of owners of adjoining and nearby plots, land 
markets if left unregulated would exhibit serious problems of market failure. 
The pattern of land uses would consequently be far from the optimum. It 
should be added, though, that land use externalities do not need to be 
negative. Households that live in close proximity to each other may find it 
easier to maintain their social networks and firms may want to locate in close 
proximity to other firms in order to reap the benefits of agglomeration 
economies, such as the easy transfer of knowledge.  
The provision of public goods is another significant source of market 
failure in land markets. In economics the term ‘public goods’ is used in a 
very specific way to describe goods (or services) which i) are non-rival in 
consumption and ii) are non-excludable. What ‘non-rival’ in consumption 
means is that if one person benefits from the provision or consumption of a 
good, this does not affect the welfare of its other consumers or the costs of 
the producer. I might share a packet of cashew nuts with my friends but the 
more I eat the less there are for my friends, and replacing the packet would 
cost resources. But this is not true of all goods – national defence is an 
example which is often used, but the same is true of National Parks or, 
indeed, any park, museum, open space, cityscape or architecturally attractive 
neighbourhood. If I enjoy a walk on London’s Hampstead Heath, this in no 
way restricts the enjoyment of others and any additional costs of park 
maintenance are so trivial we can forget about them. The exception might 
come when a park or open space begins to get congested. Then an additional 
user would impose costs. The enjoyment of existing users (as well as that of 
the additional user) would be reduced by the congestion effect. ‘Non-
excludable’ means that it is impossible to stop people consuming the good, if 
it is provided. For practical purposes I can only eat my cashew nuts if I buy 
them. If I do not pay for them it is easy to exclude me from enjoying them. 
With some goods this is not possible: for example, if a view is beautiful, it is 
impossible to exclude people from enjoying it. Cityscapes or areas of 
architectural interest are equally impossible to exclude people from and it is 
difficult to exclude them from parks. 
This class of public goods is relevant because markets will not provide any 
incentive, or sufficient incentive, to provide optimal quantities of them. It is 
also difficult to know what the optimal quantity to provide is, since markets 
do not provide the necessary signals.1 Tiebout (1956) demonstrated that this 
1 The polar opposite are ‘private goods’. For these there is a price reflecting the 
willingness of consumers to pay for the goods and so signal their preferences, given 
the distribution of incomes; and a cost reflecting the value of the resource used to 
produce the goods. The reality is that many goods are neither purely private not ‘pure’ 
public goods. There may be a degree of rivalry in consumption - for example a mildly 
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was not necessarily the case for local public goods where the ability to 
consume was determined by where someone lived. So long as such local 
public goods were provided and paid for by local governments and their 
residents and people were free to move, then people could vote with their feet 
and choose rates of local taxes and supplies of local public goods which best 
suited their pockets and preferences. But this conclusion rests on particular 
fiscal and political institutional arrangements and minimal costs of mobility, 
so it may not be generally applicable as a solution to the real world problem. 
In fact, a significant element of land use regulation is to provide such goods 
directly by preserving open space within and around cities, supplying parks 
and recreational facilities as well as conserving architecturally significant 
areas, environmentally important sites and helping to provide and maintain 
cityscapes. 
The locational specificity of land, housing and real estate is central to both 
these reasons for market failure. It also underlies yet another reason for 
market failure, related to market power. Many development projects, most 
obviously large infrastructure projects such as roads or railways but also 
large restructuring projects in developed urban areas, require the merging of 
several or many parcels of land under different ownership to make a viable 
development. A railway line that is incomplete because a particular 
landowner refused to sell the essential final parcel of land would be useless.2 
This gives increasing market power to hold-out sellers. For private 
developers, trying to assemble larger sites from several separately owned 
plots, this is a nuisance and may lead to non-development, loss of private 
profits and a suboptimal outcome in terms of social welfare. For major 
 
congested park or a piece of infrastructure for which there are some additional costs 
of maintenance; excludability is frequently a matter of the costs of exclusion and 
whether it is worth while. One issue important for welfare is that for goods that are 
non-rival in consumption, regardless of excludability, there is a strong welfare 
argument for a zero price. So long as the museum is not congested and someone 
would derive welfare from entering, even if just to shelter from the rain, then charging 
a zero price makes someone better off without reducing the welfare of anyone else 
and so it meets the criterion defined above for a welfare improvement. 
2 This was a real problem for the early canals and railways constructed after strong 
property rights had been legally established but before there was significant 
government intervention or regulation. Acts of Parliament were necessary to acquire 
the land. Stamford is now a picturesque historic market town but was intended in 
1846 to be the site of a major station on the planned railway going from London to 
Newcastle and Edinburgh. The local landowner, however, Lord Exeter (the head of 
the Cecil family) with his political influence, successfully fought off the railways thus 
preventing the town’s expansion – indeed causing its serious decline since it was a 
major coaching stop on the soon deserted great north road – but preserving his control 
of the electorate and keeping his pocket borough with two members of parliament 
(Hoskins, 1970, page 287 to 289). 
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infrastructure projects, the potential for suboptimal social welfare outcomes 
is very substantial. This led nearly all countries to introduce some form of 
compulsory powers of purchase either for government on behalf of the 
developers, or the granting of such powers directly to the companies 
themselves with (usually) significant regulation attached. This cause of 
market failure in land markets is, however, not endemic in the way that 
externalities and problems of public good provision are, and it generates a 
more specialised and particular type of regulation.  
For completeness, we should include the possibility that another 
assumption underlying the first fundamental theorem of welfare economics, 
namely that people are the best judges of their own welfare, may also be 
violated. In this case, the government may want to revert to ‘paternalism’ and 
decide for the individual how much to consume of certain goods. The goods 
that would call for such interventions are usually referred to as merit goods, 
and they may be defined as “goods that society deems to be especially 
important and that those in power feel individuals should be required or 
encouraged to consume” (Lipsey and Chrystal, 1995, p. 423). There are also 
the inverse of merit goods: goods such as hard drugs or, in some times or 
cultures, alcohol, that are judged too bad for individuals to be allowed to 
make their own choices. This type of argument could possibly be invoked to 
cover, for example, affordable housing policies, as certain groups in society – 
such as the very young or very old – may not have the effective power to 
make their own informed housing consumption choices. However, it is 
questionable whether the argument could be stretched to justify a large social 
housing sector, such as for instance in the Netherlands, where it constitutes 
about a third of the total housing stock.  
 
OPTIMAL LAND USE POLICIES IN ECONOMIC 
THEORY AND IN PRACTICE 
Since outcomes in unregulated land markets can often for a number of 
reasons be socially suboptimal government interventions in these markets 
may be welfare enhancing. This section introduces a highly simplified 
economic framework, which enables us to identify costs and benefits of land 
use regulation in the context of two particular market failures: a negative 
externality of residential land use and the public good nature of some open 
space, such as city parks. We show how this framework may – at least in 
principle – be used to derive an optimal policy. The next subsection then 
proceeds to discuss the range of assumptions and simplifications that needed 
to be made, and what this means for applying the stylised economic 
framework to land use regulation in the real world. Next to externalities and 
public goods, redistribution is often another motive for government 
intervention in land and housing markets, but since economic theory offers 
Urban Land Markets 
 
158 
                                                          
no clear reason for large-scale redistribution specifically by interventions in 
housing and land markets, we ignore this issue here.3  
 
A SIMPLE ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK FOR LAND USE POLICY 
ANALYSIS 
In order to illustrate how a welfare economic framework may be used to 
analyse optimal policy in the presence of land use externalities, we consider a 
city-region within which all residents live and work. The city-region has an 
urban core but is surrounded by a rural (or as the French might have it a 
‘peri-urban’) hinterland. This hinterland is interpreted as a multifunctional 
park that provides citizens with recreational areas, environmental amenities 
and scenic views – as in the greenbelt that was originally envisioned by 
Ebenezer Howard.4 Urban expansion would imply that open space in this 
greenbelt was reduced, or that it is moved outwards and so becomes less 
accessible to residents of the inner city. However, in unregulated markets the 
3 The second fundamental theorem of welfare economics holds that under certain 
conditions, every efficient outcome can be attained in a competitive economy by 
transferring money between agents in a lump sum fashion. So if society prefers an 
outcome in which every agent is equally well off, irrespective of their endowments in 
terms of human capital, it can attain this outcome by transferring money to agents 
with little human capital and leave the allocation of commodities to free markets. 
Hence, in the stylised world in which this result is derived, redistribution does not 
require any market intervention. In practice, it is usually not possible for governments 
to transfer money in a lump sum fashion, so it has to restore to other means of 
redistribution. The two main options are progressive income taxation and the taxation 
or subsidisation of commodities, of which the extensive social or affordable housing 
programs in some countries are an example. However, it has also been shown that 
under certain conditions, progressive income taxation is a more efficient means of 
redistribution than commodity taxation. Intuitively, the reason for this is that 
redistribution of income allows people to spend the money in ways that they judge 
most desirable themselves, whereas with redistribution in kind, it is the government 
that decides this for them. Redistribution in kind may be preferable for individuals 
whom society judges incapable of deciding what is best for them – as in the merit 
good argument, but one would expect that the number of such individuals that need to 
be protected from themselves should be relatively small. 
4 Note, however, that these assumptions require that the land in the greenbelts is open 
to public access. That was certainly the rationale for greenbelts in the original vision 
of Ebenezer Howard and it arguably applies in some countries. Lee and Fujita (1999) 
consider the case of the greenbelt around Seoul, South Korea, for which Lee and 
Linneman (1998) had shown that a premium of about 5 per cent of the land value per 
kilometre is paid for proximity to the greenbelt. Equally in the Netherlands, areas such 
as the ‘Green heart’ and green ‘Buffer zones’ between cities are accessible through a 
myriad of walking and bicycle routes. However, in other countries such as the UK and 
the USA, access is limited or manifestly absent. 
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size of the urban area is the outcome of land use decisions of individual 
households and in determining the size of their own houses and gardens, 
these households will generally ignore the loss of access to open space at the 
urban fringe that their choices impose on the wider community. Hence, they 
do not take full account of the burden that their behaviour imposes on 
society, and a government intervention in the land market may be 
appropriate. Although we may thus conveniently introduce the welfare 
economics of urban containment policies, it should be noted that the 
existence and significance of negative externalities related to the total amount 
of urban land in residential use are not in practice as clear-cut as the 
conventional wisdom on greenbelt-type policy implies.5  
We consider the market for residential land in a partial equilibrium setting. 
It is assumed that people derive utility from the consumption of residential 
land, from recreational activities in open space at the urban fringe, and from 
all other goods and services that are aggregated into a single numeraire good. 
This composite or numeraire good may be normalised in such a way, that one 
unit of it is equivalent to one currency unit. This allows us to express utility 
and social welfare in pounds sterling, Euros or any other currency unit. 
Furthermore, we assume that the demand for residential land is not affected 
by income, and that no relationships exist between the outcome in this market 
and prices in other markets. These are all simplifying assumptions to help us 
reveal more clearly important underlying relationships and policy choices. 
It is helpful to represent this welfare analysis of land use regulation 
diagrammatically as in Figure 6.1. This figure features aggregate residential 
land on the horizontal axis, and the price of a unit of residential land at the 
vertical axis. The downward sloping line D indicates the aggregate demand 
for residential land, which is the sum of all the demands of individual 
households in society – in this case all those living and working in our ‘city-
region’. This demand curve is downward sloping, because as the price of 
residential land falls households may increase the size of their houses and 
gardens, choose to live in detached houses rather than town housing or 
apartments and new households will form as housing is cheaper.6 Formally, it 
shows the particular  
5 In particular, evidence to be discussed in the section dealing with the effects of land 
use regulation suggests that residents put much more value on parks within an urban 
area than on open space at the city fringe (see for instance Table 6.1). To the extent 
that large chunks of parkland interior to the city – like Hampstead Heath in London – 
provide a similar experience to recreation in greenbelt land, they may be good 
substitutes at closer proximity for most urban residents. The economic framework for 
analysing the public provision of parks will be considered later in this section.  
6 In Britain Peterson et al. (1997) estimate an elasticity of response of - 0.1 percent: 
that is a 10 percent reduction in housing prices is associated with a 1 percent increase 
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Figure 6.1  Equilibrium in an unregulated market for residential land 
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level of consumption for every price if all consumers chose their demand for 
residential land optimally. This price may be interpreted as the social benefit 
of increasing the aggregate supply by one unit at the specified level of 
consumption, as it measures the total amount of numeraire goods that 
residents are willing to forego in order to obtain it. Hence, the area under the 
demand curve may be interpreted as the total social benefit from residential 
land consumption, or its contribution to aggregate utility, exclusive of the 
costs that are associated with it.  
Figure 6.1 also contains two supply curves. The first curve MPC1, for 
marginal private costs, indicates the costs of a unit of land that are 
internalised in markets, consisting mainly of opportunity costs (the price of 
agricultural land) and conversion costs. We assume that the curve MPC1 is 
flat, that is, the costs that are internalised in unregulated markets do not vary 
with the total supply of residential land. More agricultural land could always 
                                                                                                                             
in the rate of household formation as additional people can afford to set up on their 
own account. 
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be converted to urban use at an approximately constant cost in real terms.7 
The second supply curve MSC, for marginal social costs, adds to these 
private costs the burden imposed on society that is not reflected in market 
prices. This is the reduced accessibility of greenbelt land at the urban fringe 
which people value, but by assumption in our model, do not pay for. It can be 
measured in terms of the loss of the numeraire consumption good that would 
be associated with an equal reduction in their welfare. As numeraire goods 
are normalised to currency units, this loss may also be converted into a 
money value – the payment people would have to make to have exactly the 
same impact on their wellbeing as the loss of open space. Formally, MPC1 
indicates the private costs of producing an additional unit of residential land 
for each level of supply, and MSC adds the penalty that is equivalent to the 
loss of access to open space associated with it. The areas under these supply 
curves therefore indicate the total private and the total social costs from the 
supply of residential land. We assume that the two curves intersect when the 
total supply of residential land is zero, and that the marginal social costs 
increase with the total supply of residential land. In a very small community 
in which every person can see and walk into the surrounding green open 
countryside the externality problem would not arise. It only sets in when the 
city becomes so big that people within it begin to place a value on access to 
unbuilt land external to the city – access to true green space. This is 
predicated, though, on there being public access to that green space and one 
must accept the possibility that large ‘country parks’ internal to the urban 
area could be substitutes, even superior substitutes (see also footnotes 4 and 
5). 
Households will choose to buy residential land up to the point at which the 
cost to them is equal to the value or welfare they derive from it. In the 
absence of any government intervention their consumption of residential land 
will be at the point at which the demand curve D and the supply curve MPC1 
intersect, with a supply of S1 at a price PP
                                                          
1 for each unit of residential land. 
How should this equilibrium be evaluated from a welfare economic point of 
view? The area alpm under the demand curve measures the gross social 
benefit that is derived from the consumption S1 units of residential land. The 
total internalised production costs are measured by the area ilpm under the 
supply curve MPC1. The triangle ali that results when all internalised costs 
7 Formally, in a monocentric city, the supply curve of residential land is upward 
sloping, because as the urban area grows, the quality of agricultural land at the fringe 
falls in terms of access to jobs in the centre. Hence, the price of land within the city 
and the intensity of its usage must rise before it becomes profitable to expand. 
However, the amount of land that becomes available with each kilometre of city 
expansion increases quadratically, so for medium to large urban areas, the effect may 
be negligible for practical purposes; and land at the margin of development should 
have a constant real supply price.  
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are subtracted from the gross social benefit is the consumers’ surplus in the 
residential land market. Intuitively, it derives from the fact that all except the 
marginal consumer would have been willing to pay more than they actually 
had to for the land they consume. The consumers’ surplus may also be 
interpreted as the value of the numeraire good people would have to be given 
in order to make them equally well off if the consumption of residential land 
was zero. However, it does not take account of the loss of access to open 
space at the urban fringe their consumption choices entail which is not 
internalised in the cost function. This additional ‘social cost’ is measured by 
the triangle idl. This can be interpreted as the amount of the numeraire good 
or money that would have to be taken away from society to have the exact 
same negative impact on welfare as the loss of access to open space.  
Because in making their own individual decisions consumers ignore the 
external costs of land consumption in the free market equilibrium this 
outcome cannot be optimal. This is readily seen in Figure 6.1. Consider a fall 
in the consumption of residential land by one unit, relative to the free market 
outcome (S1, PP1). This reduces the gross social benefit by an amount equal to 
OP1P , while the reduction of social costs (both internal and external) amounts 
to OC1. Equivalently, we can say that a marginal reduction of the 
consumption of residential land does not affect the consumers’ surplus in this 
market, but that it reduces the external costs by an amount C1 - PP1. Hence, on 
balance, it makes society better off. Indeed, the condition for optimality in 
this framework is that a marginal change in residential land use would create 
changes in social benefits and costs that exactly offset each other.  
We can now use this analysis to show how government could intervene in 
land markets to produce this socially optimal outcome, first by imposing a 
tax on land consumption and then by direct regulation. Figure 6.2 illustrates a 
tax on the conversion of open space to residential land, τ1, which raises the 
marginal private costs of supplying residential land to the curve MPC2.8 
Again, households will choose their consumption of residential land such that 
the social benefit of increasing aggregate consumption by one unit equals the 
actual costs to suppliers of providing it. Since these costs now include the 
development tax, this leads to an equilibrium with a lower supply of 
residential land S2 at a higher price PP
                                                          
2. The gross social benefit derived from 
the consumption of residential land is now indicated by the area agom, and 
the total private costs are given by the area egom, including tax expenditures 
egki. The consumers’ surplus is the triangle age. It is much smaller than in 
8 In a stylised model, this development tax is equivalent to a tax on the consumption 
of residential land, because developers will pass it on to consumers in a competitive 
setting. Although direct regulation of land use is much more common than this type of 
fiscal incentive, there is some analogy with the Impact Fees that are gaining 
popularity in the USA. We will get back to the topic of Impact Fees in section 4.  
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the free market equilibrium, both because less residential land is now 
consumed (incurring a reduction of glk), and because people pay a higher 
price for it (incurring a reduction of egki), although since this latter rectangle 
represents the increase in tax revenues, consumers could be fully compen- 
 
Figure 6.2  An optimal tax on residential land development 
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sated if these were entirely redistributed to them.9 Therefore, the costs of this 
policy, interpreted as the loss of consumers’ surplus in the residential land 
market that cannot be compensated by tax revenues, amounts only to the dark 
grey triangle glk. This cost reflects the shift in residential land consumption 
caused by the tax, which might be reflected in slightly smaller houses and 
gardens or in other adjustments reducing personal consumption of space. 
However, as the aggregate consumption of residential land was – before the 
tax was imposed – too large because of the unpriced reduction in access to 
open space at the urban fringe it caused, the tax also generates benefits. The 
total external costs are now given by the triangle igk, so the tax leads to a 
reduction of external costs of gdlk. This trapezoid may be interpreted as the 
9 This assumes that tax revenues are converted entirely into welfare – so there is no 
deadweight loss associated with collection and spending.  
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social value of the open space protected from development by the tax. The 
net welfare gain of imposing the tax, τ1, is the difference between the costs, 
glk, and the benefits, gdlk; that is the light grey triangle gdl.  
There can be government failure as well as market failure, however, and in 
Figure 6.3, we illustrate the case in which the government sets the 
development tax at a level τ2 that is too high. The marginal private cost curve 
is now  
Figure 6.3  A suboptimal quantity restriction on the supply of residential land 
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raised to the level MPC3, resulting in a supply of S3 at a price of PP3. The 
trapezoid acnm is the value of the gross benefit society derives from the 
consumption of residential land. After subtracting the total private costs 
bcnm, (of which bcji represents the tax) the consumers’ surplus of acb is left 
over. The loss of consumers’ surplus relative to the free market equilibrium 
that cannot be compensated through tax revenues amounts to the triangle clj – 
which exceeds the value of the benefits generated by the lower external costs 
imposed by loss of open space that is represented by the area of the trapezoid 
hdlj. The net welfare effect relative to the free market outcome is the 
difference between the light grey area gdl and the dark grey area cgh. Hence, 
it is seen that this particular level of the development tax not only exceeds the 
social optimum, but it also leaves society worse off than in the equilibrium 
without any government intervention at all.  
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As illustrated in Figure 6.3, the government could also secure the 
equilibrium (S3, PP
                                                          
3) by imposing a direct restriction on the supply of 
residential land, for instance through an urban growth boundary or the 
designation of greenbelt land. In practice, this type of direct land use 
regulation is much more common than the imposition of development taxes. 
If the government were to impose a growth boundary and prohibit any 
residential land development in excess of the quantity S3, then the supply 
curve would in effect be the vertical line at S3. In our simplified framework, 
the welfare implications of directly limiting the supply of residential land to 
S3 are the same as when the government levies a development tax τ2. 
Moreover, for any level of development tax, the government could impose an 
equivalent quantity restriction, and vice versa. However, although this does 
not affect net welfare in principle, it should be noted that in the case of the 
quantity restriction, the area bcji cannot be interpreted as a tax revenue. 
Instead, while pushing residential land prices above their marginal production 
costs, direct supply restrictions give rise to scarcity rents, which accrue to 
owners of land with permission for residential development. Hence, there are 
important distributional consequences, as we will see in the next section.10 
Furthermore, the scarcity rent on a unit of land with permission for 
development may be interpreted as the shadow price of direct land use 
restrictions, and being equal to τ2 – the tax that would lead to the same 
outcome, it is sometimes referred to as a regulatory tax (cf. Glaeser et al., 
2005, and Cheshire and Hilber, 2008). 
Whereas we have focused so far on a negative externality of residential 
land use, the public good nature of certain land uses such as open space may 
be a much more important rationale for government intervention, particularly 
within urban areas. As explained in the second section which asked why 
intervention in urban land markets is needed, public goods are characterised 
by non-rivalry and non-excludability in consumption, and these conditions 
substantially hold for certain types of land use such as public parks, beautiful 
landscapes or coastlines and rare habitats; and features of cities, such 
cityscapes and historic districts or architecturally interesting neighbourhoods. 
The free market would not provide enough of these goods, because their 
social benefit could not be fully converted into a private flow of revenues to 
compensate the provider. In other words, the private provision of public 
goods like city parks would generate a particular type of positive externality; 
the urban community would benefit from them without fully paying either for 
the social value they generated or the costs of provision. Hence, the reason 
10 Besides transfers from consumers to landowners, these scarcity rents may also 
dissipate in rent seeking behaviour. Furthermore, in a spatial setting, they may be 
partly offset by foregone gains to owners of land where the development is restricted. 
This is discussed in section 4. Both considerations are ignored in this stylised 
framework.  
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for government intervention here is conceptually related to the negative 
externality of residential land use that was discussed earlier in this section, 
and subsidies (rather than taxes) or direct provision of these public goods 
could equally generate optimal outcomes. Again, in the practice of land use 
planning, public goods are usually provided directly, rather then through 
pecuniary incentives to private developers.  
 
Figure 6.4  The optimal provision of a public good 
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We illustrate the optimal provision of land in parks in Figure 6.4, which 
has a similar general setup as Figures 6.1 to 6.3. On the horizontal axis, we 
now measure the total area in parks rather than the amount of land in 
residential use. A market for land in parks does not exist, so that demand and 
supply curves do not reflect market prices. Nevertheless, it may still be 
assumed that land in parks generates benefits to the urban community, and 
that if land in parks was not available in order to have an equivalent level of 
welfare, residents would have to be compensated with more numeraire goods 
– measured in currency units. This implies people, collectively, would be 
willing to pay a certain sum of money in return for the provision of these 
parks. The ‘demand curve’ MSWTP should be interpreted in this way – as the 
marginal social willingness to pay for land in parks. This curve is downward 
sloping because the people derive less utility from an additional piece of park 
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land if the total supply of parks in the area is already substantial – as is aptly 
illustrated in the Cheshire and Sheppard (1995) paper that we will discuss in 
the next section. On the other hand, if society provides these parks, it pays a 
price in terms of forgone alternative land use and maintenance costs. Here, 
we assume this marginal social cost curve MSC is upward sloping, though the 
argument would run in the same way for a horizontal supply curve.11 As for 
optimal development taxes and land use restrictions dealing with a negative 
externality of residential land use, the optimal supply of land in parks has the 
property that the marginal social benefit it generates equals the marginal 
costs of production, so at the optimum, the net welfare effect of providing an 
additional unit of park land is zero. This point is simply the intersection of 
the MSWTP and MSC curves, where an amount S of park land is provided. 
The gross total benefit derived from this policy is measured by the trapezoid 
agom and by subtracting the total social costs igom we obtain the net social 
benefit of agi.  
 
FROM WELFARE ECONOMIC THEORY TO PRACTICE 
What value do the optimal policy rules that we derived in the previous 
subsection have for land use planning in the real world? Clearly, numerous 
simplifications have been made, that could drive a wedge between optimal 
policy in theory and practice. This subsection discusses a number of these 
simplifications, and how relaxing them might alter policy prescriptions.  
One major simplification of the approach in the previous subsection is that 
for both residential land and open space, it aggregates demand and supply to 
the level of ‘society’ – composed of all the residents of a city-region. 
However, in section 2 where it was asked why intervention in urban land 
markets is needed we have stressed that many land market failures arise from 
the fact that each parcel of land has a specific and fixed location. The 
bundling of land use with accessibility implies that social welfare depends 
not just on the quantity of open space but on its distribution relative to that of 
residential land. For instance, if all open space is supplied in the north of the 
city, and residents live in the south, then the social value of this open space 
will be less than if it was supplied in a more accessible way. On the other 
hand, a certain quantity of open space may be appreciated more when it is 
provided in one large area, than when it is divided into many small pieces. 
Moreover, patterns of residential land use determine landscapes and 
cityscapes, and some patterns may be more pleasing than others. If we allow 
for hills and valleys, then houses on the high ground will command views 
which are valued. But having houses on hills may deprive other residents of 
11 Note that if the park is publicly provided, the distinction between private and social 
costs becomes meaningless.  
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views of open hill tops. The implication is that for a more complete policy 
prescription, we should disaggregate our framework to many different local 
residential land markets, and derive an optimal regulation of land use for 
each of them. Nevertheless, the bundling of land use and accessibility implies 
that the local supply of open space is capitalised into land prices. Land and so 
the houses on it located near a nice park is more expensive, all other things 
equal. So in contrast to the assumptions made in the previous section, the 
social value of open space may be largely reflected in market prices. This 
may have important consequences for the provision of certain types of open 
space by local governments or private developers not considered here.12  
A second complication that arises when implementing the policy 
prescriptions of the previous subsection is that their optimality is conditional 
on the absence of market failures in other markets. However, as we have 
extensively discussed in the section where the question was asked why 
intervention in urban land markets is needed, urban land use is associated 
with a myriad of externalities, which are not always easy to disentangle. In 
principle, externalities should be addressed in the most direct way possible, 
because such policies are likely to be the most effective, while generating the 
least undesirable side effects. For instance, if the use of carbon-based fuel is 
excessive from a social point of view contributing to global warming, the 
answer is to address this market failure directly. The closest we are likely to 
get to an optimal solution is by imposing a fuel tax. This gives households a 
direct incentive to reduce fuel usage. It would push up the demand for higher 
density living only to the extent that there is a link between housing density 
and the demand for transport. Similarly, a link between urban form and 
traffic congestion may exist but congestion externalities will likely be 
12 Consider for example a developer who owns all the land in a neighbourhood. The 
developer may give up some land and create parks instead. These parks push up the 
price of surrounding houses, compensating for the opportunity costs of assigning land 
to parks. Under certain conditions it may be shown that, if all benefits of the parks 
capitalise fully within the neighbourhood, the developer will provide an optimal 
amount of them while maximizing profits. So in this case, no government intervention 
is required to arrive at the social optimum. This line of argument has, for example, 
been applied to the characteristic development of West London: residential squares 
surrounded by houses. It has been suggested that the more unified land ownership 
patterns to the West of London made this a more common pattern of development 
than the high density development on the land in fragmented ownership to the East of 
London. The land owners and developers in the west could internalise the benefits of 
the open space they provided. However, other factors such as the spatial distribution 
of natural amenities (clean air for example because of the prevailing westerly winds) 
played an important role. West London was developed for richer households; the 
demand for open space is income elastic so was more valuable in the developments 
designed for richer people. 
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addressed more efficiently by taxing them directly, rather than regulating 
land use in such a way that the urban form becomes less congestion prone.  
Yet in practice, land use regulation is often treated as a solution to a wide 
range of externalities. To illustrate the disadvantages that this may have, let 
us consider again the example of a negative externality of fuel use. If the 
government seeks to reduce these external costs by restricting the supply of 
residential land through urban containment policies the only effect on fuel 
use will come from a more compact urban form reducing car mileage. There 
are two issues to consider here. The first is that a restraint on urban land take 
will only affect new development – perhaps as little as 1 per cent of all 
development. The result would be that even if there is any causal relationship 
between density and less fuel use, the impact via land use controls will be 
painfully slow. The second point is that reactions may be altogether more 
complex. A more compact urban form might intensify social contacts so that, 
while trips are shorter on average, the total number of trips increases. 
Because houses and shops would be smaller, shopping and restocking trips 
may be more frequent and more subject to congestion. So overall the land use 
policy is likely to be at best marginally effective, and it may even increase 
the external costs of fuel use.13  
A third major assumption underlying the derivation of optimal taxes or 
direct regulation in the case of externalities and public goods is that the 
government has sufficient information. For instance, in order to find the 
optimal development tax of Figure 6.2, the government needs information 
about the private and social costs of residential land use. Moreover, if it 
chooses to restrict land use directly, it also has to know the shape of the 
demand curve, and because of the spatial fixity of land, in principle it has to 
know the shape of these curves at each location. Implementation of the 
optimal supply of parks in Figure 6.4 presumes knowledge about the value 
that an urban community attaches to the marginal unit of land in parks, which 
is even more complicated since there is no market for parks and residents 
have an incentive to overstate their valuation in surveys (‘free-riding’). 
Although the informational requirement for optimal land use regulation may 
seem prohibitive the bundling of land and accessibility also offers the 
opportunity for measuring the social costs and benefits of particular types of 
land use providing amenities, such as open space, or disamenities, such as 
noise or pollution. In so far as these are capitalised in land prices we can 
13 Conversely, it has been argued that fuel taxes should be increased because this 
would lead to more compact urban form. However, fuel taxes have been shown to be 
less efficient instruments for this purpose than development taxes or growth 
boundaries (cf. Bento et al., 2006, Cheshire and Sheppard, 2002). One of the 
undesirable side effects of raising fuel taxes, relative to these direct instruments, is 
that it increases the density gradient in cities.  
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estimate their social value through the impact they have on house prices. As 
we will see later, this is one of the main techniques for empirical welfare 
analysis of land use regulation.  
In summary, we might say that policy implications of the simple 
framework set out in the next subsection should be hedged about with many 
provisos – some relating to the nature of the particular externalities and 
sources of market failure and others relating to more technical issues 
including failures in other markets which may have a bearing on the 
particular market – here the land market – we are interested in, and a 
substantial informational burden exists on top of this. Policies in the real 
world may end up attempting to achieve something close to a second best and 
the best policy mix will need to be based on both the unachievable ideal and 
on judgement about how significant particular market failures are and how 
failures in one set of markets may interact with failures in others. 
Nevertheless, the intuition obtained here provides a useful and in fact 
practical benchmark. In particular, government interventions in land and 
housing markets always generate costs and benefits for society, and policy 
makers should aim to strike a balance between them.  
 
EVIDENCE ON THE EFFECTS OF LAND USE 
REGULATION 
This section reviews some of the evidence that has been built up over the past 
20 years or so about the welfare effects of land use planning. In principle the 
net effects could be positive or negative. On the one hand by correcting 
market failure and ensuring a supply of amenities that would otherwise be 
undersupplied, land use regulation in the form of planning or zoning, creates 
benefits. At the same time, however, it may restrict the supply of valued 
goods – notably the supply of specific kinds of space – in housing, offices, 
shops, factories or, of course, in the form of private open space: in gardens. 
Any planning policy that curbs urban expansion, increases densities or 
restricts building heights necessarily restricts the supply of a particular type 
of space. If supply is restricted it is not just that the price is driven up, so the 
good in question becomes more expensive, there may be knock on effects on 
productivity and mobility and there will certainly be distributional effects. 
Those landowners who own land on which it is allowed to build (or build 
higher) get an increase in their asset values; those who are unable to develop 
their assets in the most profitable way get a corresponding reduction in asset 
values. Those who own houses gain in asset values, especially if their houses 
are endowed with more of the attribute the planning system is restricting the 
supply of (they have bigger gardens or their houses are constructed in the 
greenbelt); those who rent or are would-be house buyers suffer a reduction in 
asset values or incomes. We review the evidence of each of these effects in 
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turn, including the rather sparse evidence on the net welfare effects: that is 
the net impact on welfare allowing for both the value of benefits generated 
and higher costs imposed on the use of space.  
 
THE VALUATION OF PLANNING INDUCED AMENITIES 
The two main methods for empirical valuation of open space are via the 
estimation of ‘hedonic’ models and stated preference analysis. The use of 
hedonic14 models is theoretically preferable since it is based on clear 
theoretical foundations and observes the actual behaviour of people. As 
pointed out in the section that deals with the necessity of intervention in 
urban land markets, each house consists of a complex bundle of attributes 
and because each parcel of land has a unique location its occupation 
determines access to a wide range of local public goods. This implies that 
their value is reflected (or capitalised) in house prices. The price of any house 
is in a sense the aggregate price of all its attributes, including the access it 
gives to local amenities and public goods. In fact these non-structural 
attributes typically account for the great majority of the total value of a 
house. Although as an empirical technique the estimation of hedonic models 
goes way back to the 1920s (see Sheppard, 1999), it was Rosen (1974) who 
provided the theoretical framework and showed how the valuation of such 
goods may be estimated in hedonic models. A sizeable and ever growing 
literature has followed his idea.  
In their survey of hedonic studies on the benefits of open space, 
McConnell and Walls (2005) report a wide variation between estimates, and 
they highlight the importance of distinguishing between different types of 
open space. The value of preserving a piece of land in a certain use is bound 
to depend strongly on whether it is a park in an urbanised area, a piece of 
exurban agricultural land or a wetland. The careful study of house prices in 
the Minneapolis – St. Paul metropolitan area in the USA by Anderson and 
West (2006) shows more than this. Not only does the capitalised value of 
proximity to open space depend on the type of open space and how far away 
it is from the house but it also varies according to the characteristics of the 
neighbourhood. For an average home, they find that benefits from proximity 
to open space range from a low of 0.0035 per cent of sales price for every 
one percent decrease in the distance to the nearest neighbourhood park, to a 
high of 0.034 per cent for every one percent decrease in the distance to the 
nearest lake. Importantly, they find that the value of proximity to open space 
rises with average income and density in the neighbourhood, while it falls 
with distance to the central business district. Given that access to open space 
is a ‘normal’ good – people consume more of it as they get richer – it is not 
14 ‘Hedonic’ from the ancient Greek for ‘pleasure’. 
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surprising to find that it has a higher value in richer neighbourhoods. Equally 
the finding that its value is higher in higher density neighbourhoods suggests 
that at least to an extent public open space is a substitute for private open 
space. The reason why the value of open space falls with distance from the 
city centre could be that the total supply of (private and public) open space in 
suburban areas is higher, so that its marginal benefit is lower, or that 
residents in suburbs have easier access to open space outside of city 
boundaries as a substitute for parks. 
A potential drawback of estimating the value of proximity to open space 
by means of its hedonic price is that while this yields the slope of the 
valuation of open space with respect to distance, its level – its total value – is 
not inferred. The valuation of a large special park might decline less with 
distance, simply because it is appreciated over a wider area, so that its value 
to the whole metropolitan community might be considerably larger than the 
total value of a local park of which the valuation declines more steeply with 
distance. This problem is circumvented by estimating the value of the amount 
of open space surrounding a house, at the expense of imposing more 
restrictive assumptions on the relationship between valuation and distance. 
This latter approach has been applied for instance by Cheshire and Sheppard 
(1995, 1998), who estimated a hedonic model for house prices in two British 
towns, subject to land use restrictions that varied significantly in severity. In 
order to measure the benefits of planning induced amenities, these authors 
considered the share of land in a square kilometre around each house that was 
used for either ‘accessible’ or ‘inaccessible’ open space, as well as the share 
of land that was not in industrial use.15 Accessible open space meant 
accessible to the public – parks, recreation grounds, churchyards or common 
land; this was mainly internal to the urban area. Inaccessible open space was 
land not built on and not accessible to the public. This was mainly greenbelt 
land used for farming at the urban fringe but included private woodland. 
Increasing the shares of both types of open space was found to yield 
significant gross benefits, with the benefits associated with accessible open 
space considerably exceeding those from inaccessible open space, but 
accessible open space was valued less at the margin in the town where land 
use planning was more restrictive. In a similar hedonic analysis of house 
prices in three Dutch cities, Rouwendal and Van der Straaten (2008) find a 
significant effect of the share of land in parks and public gardens within 500 
metres, while proximity to industrial land decreases house values.  
While the main focus of these studies was on the value of open space 
within urban areas, the preservation of open space outside cities may generate 
15 The authors did note, however, that there were no significant impacts on house 
prices of open space (or less industrial land) in locations further than the surrounding 
spare kilometre. 
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significant benefits as well. As we saw, Cheshire and Sheppard (1995) found 
some value for agricultural land in the greenbelt for houses within the 
kilometre square. Irwin (2002) however concentrates on this issue, analysing 
residential transactions in an exurban region in central Maryland, USA. She 
found that within 400 metres of a house, the conversion of one acre of 
developable pastureland to conservation land raised the average house price 
by 1.9 per cent; converting it to public land yielded a premium of 0.6 per 
cent. That is the more certainly the agricultural land was protected from 
development the greater the ‘value’. Interestingly, conversion to low-density 
residential land had a negative impact on surrounding house prices, 
underlining the fact that one of the important attractions of open space is 
simply that it is not developed. This negative impact is also likely to be one 
reason for NIMBYism. As Fischel (2001) has argued, since houses form a 
substantial element in peoples’ asset portfolios and they are immobile, there 
is a significant incentive to protect their value by using local zoning or 
planning policies to prevent land in one’s neighbourhood from being 
developed.  
Although the hedonic approach has the advantage that it rests on revealed 
preferences – actual behaviour – it also has potential limitations. It is only 
truly applicable if the value of the amenity in question is localised within the 
housing market area covered by the study. This may be reasonable in the case 
of a neighbourhood park or a local school but would be questionable in the 
case of an amenity for which demand extended over a wide area. This is very 
likely to be the case with, for example, National Parks, and might possibly be 
the case with a Greenbelt provided that it acts as an accessible recreational 
area, such as the ‘Green heart’ in the west of the Netherlands. It is also 
almost certainly the case with world famous attractions, such as Hyde Park, 
in London, or a famous cityscape, such as Venice. There is an alternative 
approach to valuing such amenities and that is stated preferences, sometimes 
known as ‘contingent valuation’. In this approach people are asked to put a 
value – how much they would be willing to pay and in what circumstances – 
to have access to or just to know that particular amenities exist so they could 
access them if they felt inclined. This approach has significant disadvantages 
since people may make different choices or suggest different values when 
they are actually confronted with decisions for which they have to pay. There 
is also a potential for the ‘free rider’ problem. That is people overstate their 
valuations in order to increase the supply of an amenity that will largely be 
paid for by others. Although research using the contingent valuation method 
has become substantially more sophisticated over time still these 
methodological concerns remain (cf. Arrow et al., 1993, McConnell and 
Walls, 2005). Nevertheless, it may yield valuable insights that complement 
findings relying on revealed preferences, and sometimes there is simply no 
alternative method available.  
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As in their survey of hedonic studies, the McConnell and Walls (2005) 
survey of stated preference research finds substantial heterogeneity in the 
estimated stated value of open space, and again its type and location appear 
to matter a lot. Nevertheless, for agricultural land, the stated value is in the 
same order of magnitude as in the Irwin (2002) study of exurban house prices 
discussed previously, suggesting that fears about missing wider benefits of 
agricultural land using hedonic methods may be misplaced. Also consistent 
with Irwin’s results, stated preference studies suggest that negative 
externalities of residential development are an important motivation for the 
preservation of open space. Based on a survey of stated preference research 
in the UK, Barker (2003) also reports a strong dependency of the value of 
open space on its location and use (see Table 6.1, copied from Barker (2003), 
page 36). For instance, publicly accessibly open space in the urban core is 
valued much more than greenbelt land, and the landscape value of intensively 
farmed land is particularly low. These values are broadly consistent with 
those in Cheshire and Sheppard (1995). Open space at the urban fringe not 
accessible to the public has a relatively low value although its value is 
significant. Interestingly, the values reported in Barker are significantly 
higher than in most US studies that are surveyed by McConnell and Walls. 
Perhaps, this is a parallel finding to that of Anderson and West (2006): open 
space is more valuable in more densely developed contexts and densities are 
greater in the UK than in the USA. In addition of course, in the UK there are 
some access rights even to agricultural land by means of ‘public footpaths’ or 
ancient rights of way. So the amenity value of agricultural land in the UK – 
even in Europe generally – may be higher than in the USA or other countries 
which have no rights of public access to private land at all. 
 
Table 6.1  Benefits from different land use in the UK 
 
Land type Present benefit 
(per hectare per year, in 2001 
₤) 
Urban core public space (city park) 54,000 
Urban fringe greenbelt 889 
Urban fringe forested land 2,700 
Rural forested land 6,626 
Agricultural extensive 3,150 
Agricultural intensive 103 
Natural and semi-natural wetlands 6,616 
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er (2003) 
hile our discussion of the benefits of land use regulation has so far 
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THE COSTS OF LAND USE RESTRICTIONS: HOUSING SUPPLY 
ese benefits, land use regulation imposes limits on supply, 
                                                          
Source: Bark
 
W
cussed on the provision of open space, it is important to keep in mind that 
urban planning is about much more. Other aspects, which have received 
considerable attention in so-called ‘New Urbanism’ and ‘smart growth’ 
initiatives in the US, are dense development, the mixture of land uses, access 
by public transit and the provision of infrastructure for pedestrians and 
bicycles. The valuation of such planning-induced features of neighbourhoods 
may be estimated using similar hedonic or stated preference methods. An 
interesting example is Song and Knaap (2003; 2004), who find significant 
effects for several new urbanism design features in a hedonic model of the 
Portland, USA housing market. For instance, they find that the connectivity 
of local street networks, pedestrian accessibility to commercial uses and 
proximity to light rail stations raise house values. On the other hand they find 
that higher densities of neighbourhoods and mixed land uses within a 
neighbourhood have a negative impact on house prices. This may be 
comparable to the finding that there is a positive income elasticity of demand 
for (private) space and that more industrial land in a neighbourhood generates 
a negative price effect. Nevertheless, Song and Knaap show that these effects 
are more than compensated by the many positive contributions of new 
urbanism design features to house prices, so that neighbourhoods that by and 
large adhere to these principles command a significant premium.  
 
AND PRICES 
In generating th
although the question has to be asked, what exactly does the regulation 
restrict the supply of? Different systems and instruments of land use planning 
may restrict the supply of different attributes of the built environment. For 
example planning system in the UK and in some South-East Asian countries 
explicitly restrict the supply of land for urban development by imposing 
containment boundaries and greenbelts. But they do not impose much 
restriction on the subdivision of existing developed sites. In the USA, in 
contrast, there are strong restrictions on converting existing houses to 
multiple occupation or to subdividing built lots. Many communities also 
impose minimum lot sizes which, to European eyes, can be oppressively 
large.16 Spatial planning in the Netherlands combines restrictions on urban 
16 Some communities in the mid West have 10 acre minimum lot sizes. Glaeser and 
Gyourko (2003) conclude that in many communities in New England the willingness 
to pay for an increase in lot size beyond the mean is negative! That is people are being 
Urban Land Markets 
 
176 
pply restrictions 
co
ainly of condominiums, the 
ma
o been 
rel
prices (increasing in real terms by a factor of 3.5 between 1955 and 2002 – 
expansion through greenbelts with regulation on the type and size of houses 
to be built, but it tends to foster higher density development rather than 
minimum lot sizes. Furthermore, restrictions on building height are a form of 
land use regulation that is observed all over the world.  
Notwithstanding the heterogeneous form in which su
me, their effect is to push up house prices. Indeed, various countries and 
cities have experienced soaring house prices in recent years, and in some 
cases, the role of planning as a mechanism restricting supply has been well 
established. Glaeser et al. (2005) in their study of the Manhattan housing 
market, where prices increased by more than a half between 1980 and 2000, 
concluded that supply restrictions imposed by the New York zoning laws 
particularly on height, were the likely cause.  
Since the Manhattan market consists m
rginal construction costs of new housing amount to the costs of increasing 
building height, which can be estimated fairly accurately. The authors 
calculated that average condominium prices exceeded $600 per square foot in 
the early 2000s, while construction costs for space on an additional floor – 
even for the typical high-quality, luxury-type condominium unit – were no 
higher than $300 per square foot. Given these costs and prices in an 
unrestricted competitive market, the construction of condominiums would 
have been a lucrative business so high construction rates should have been 
observed. However, only 21,000 new units were permitted throughout the 
entire decade of the 1990s, whereas there were 13,000 new units permitted in 
1960 alone. They argue that since the construction industry in New York is 
highly competitive, the difference between prices and construction costs must 
be interpreted as a shadow price of planning restrictions, or as a regulatory 
tax (see our discussion in the section which provides a simple economic 
framework for land use policy analysis). In other words, restrictions on 
building heights have pushed up house prices in this city. Left without the 
height restrictions developers would have built higher – because it was 
profitable to do so. Similarly, Quigley and Raphael (2005) show that in 
Californian cities where land use regulation is more restrictive, new 
construction is less sensitive to prices and housing is more expensive.  
In some European countries, a rise in aggregate house prices has als
ated to land use regulation. This has been a particular issue in the UK for 
instance, where there has not only been a long-run upward trend in real house 
see Cheshire and Sheppard 2004), but an increasing volatility in the housing 
market. The argument here is that if the supply becomes less responsive to 
                                                                                                                             
constrained to buy and consume more land than they would ideally like to. But they 
still found that house prices were increased as a result of this restriction on supply. 
What was being restricted was the supply of house+land bundles.  
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ver the same 30-year 
pe
rket, Glaeser et al. (2005) admit 
tha
a critical assessment of the empirical literature on the effect of land use 
re
e  
es n of this effect are fairly standard in the econometrics of policy 
ev
price changes because of regulatory restrictions, any short run changes in 
demand translate more directly into price changes. In a series of reports to the 
Treasury and the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, Barker (2003, 2004) 
identified both a falling affordability of housing and a reduced 
responsiveness of supply to demand. She argued that the British planning 
system was the main cause of these problems. Furthermore, the Barker 
reports contain a thorough discussion of the consequences of such housing 
and land market institutions for the wider economy and for aggregate 
welfare. Real house prices have also risen substantially over the past decades 
in the Netherlands (increasing by a factor of 3 in real terms since the early 
1970s), which may be attributed at least in part to a lack or supply 
responsiveness. Vermeulen and Rouwendal (2007) find that the Dutch 
housing supply had become almost totally price-inelastic as a consequence of 
government interventions in land and housing markets.  
Long-term trends in real house prices in the UK and the Netherlands 
contrast starkly with, for instance, the German experience, where the real 
price of houses fell in both the decades of the 1980s and 1990s and was 
completely stable over the whole period 1971 to 2002. O
riod German real household disposable incomes increased at 2.6 percent a 
year compared to 2.3 percent in the Netherlands and 2.9 percent in the UK 
(OECD, 2004), so variation in this typical determinant of housing demand 
across these countries has been modest compared to the observed variation in 
real house price growth. However, similar shifts in demand may lead to 
strongly divergent price developments under different supply conditions, and 
in line with this argument, the estimated price elasticity of housing supply in 
Germany of 6 is of a completely different order of magnitude than in the 
other two countries (Swank et al., 2002).  
It should be recognised, however, that many studies relating aggregate 
housing supply and prices to land use regulation fail specifically to identify 
the causal effect of particular regulatory measures. For instance, in their 
study of the Manhattan condominium ma
t: 
while it is difficult to think of a plausible alternative explanation of why buildings 
are not taller, we recognise that our analysis essentially is naming a residual (p. 
351).  
In 
gulation on house prices, Quigley and Rosenthal (2005) find that the 
vidence is mixed and inconclusive. Some of the challenges to proper
timatio
aluation. In particular, there may be simultaneity in housing market 
developments and the imposition of land use policies, and it is difficult to 
control for factors that affect both. For instance, wealthier communities 
where housing is more luxurious might have a taste for certain zoning 
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erage delay 
in 
s (p. 84).  
for instance, 
‘grotesque’ (Muellbauer, 2005) discontinuities exist between the price of land 
                                                          
regulations (and the incomes, of course, to indulge such tastes). In addition to 
these issues, the measurement of land use regulation is problematic, because 
the heterogeneity in shapes it may take is vast, ranging from caps on 
population or construction to urban growth boundaries and from minimum lot 
size zoning to Impact Fees17 (Quigley and Rosenthal provide a taxonomy in 
their survey). There is no reason to expect that these different policy options 
have similar effects on housing market outcomes, so the estimated effect of 
an aggregate index of land use regulation is difficult to interpret.  
Nevertheless, recent studies that deal with one or more of these issues do 
suggest that land use regulation restricts housing supply while pushing up 
prices. For instance, in an analysis of new residential construction in US 
cities, Mayer and Somerville (2000) distinguish separately the av
obtaining permission for subdivisions, the number of growth management 
techniques and the imposition of impact fees. They report that metropolitan 
areas with more extensive regulation can have up to 45 percent fewer starts 
and price elasticities that are more than 20 percent lower than those in less-
regulated markets, even if the effect of Impact Fees is not statistically 
significant. Ihlanfeldt (2007) analyses the impact of an aggregate measure of 
land use regulations on jurisdictional house prices in Florida, US. Dealing 
carefully with the issue of endogeneity, he also finds a significant positive 
impact. However, in another study with Burge (Burge and Ihlanfeldt, 2006) 
he had already shown that communities which used Impact Fees and 
therefore had a greater fiscal incentive to permit development were indeed 
less restrictive. 
Besides methodological issues, Quigley and Rosenthal (2005) suggest that 
part of the difficulty in establishing an upward effect of land use regulation 
on prices is that in practice, they may not be binding: 
The net effect of adopting development restrictions may ultimately be 
symbolic only, meant to appease “not-in-my-backyard (NIMBY)” and other 
constituencies, but generally lacking the will or ability to implement true 
growth management in the face of population pressure
This statement is telling for the differences that exist between planning in 
the US and in many European countries, where governments tend to have a 
much stronger grip on land use and be far more restrictive in terms of land 
supply. In South-East England or the west of the Netherlands, 
17 Though Impact Fees, in principle, cannot legally be used in the USA as a 
mechanism of land use regulations since they have to satisfy a ‘rational nexus’ test: 
that is for them to be legally valid government has to be able to show a clear 
connection between the development and the need for additional infrastructure etc. 
and the level of fees has to be a function of these costs (see Ihlanfeldt and 
Shaughnessy, 2004). 
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in agricultural use and adjacent land that is zoned for residential 
development. Cheshire and Sheppard (2005) report an increase of price from 
£7.500 to £3,000,000 per hectare at the urban boundary in Reading and data 
for 2007 – see Figure 6.5 – shows several locations where the value of 
agricultural land that is rezoned to permit residential development is well 
over £6,000,000 per hectare: so getting permission to change use from 
agricultural to residential increase the price of land some 700-fold. Against 
the back- 
Figure 6.5  Prices of developable cleared land in the UK South East 
 
round of such direct evidence on the planning-induced segmentation of land 
markets, the question of whether land use regulation raises prices seems 
somewhat pedantic.  
Nevertheless, in spite of a sizeable literature on the impact of land use
Comment [WV1]: Source in 
this Figure should be adjusted and 
added to references 
g
at designation under the US Endangered Species Act. 
Th
 
regulation on supply and prices, evidence on its costs in terms of welfare and 
their distribution over different groups in society is scarce. Quigley and 
Swoboda (2007) consider restrictions on the amount of developable land 
through critical habit
eir analysis is only of costs - they ignore any benefits - and their prime 
focus is the distinction between partial equilibrium effects in the preserved 
area and general equilibrium effects in the wider urban area, assuming that 
the total regional population is given. The authors show theoretically that 
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look only at costs and ignore any potential benefits. They show 
tha
e account of the welfare effects of land use regulation 
that is empirically founded on revealed preferences in land prices. They use 
rket, discussed in the 
k for land use policy 
reductions in the amount of developable land increase the population density 
in existing urban areas and induce urban expansion into other areas. The 
owners of both types of land benefit, while consumers of housing and owners 
of the protected land lose. The model is calibrated on data for a typical US 
city to show that general equilibrium effects of critical habitat designation are 
substantially larger than partial equilibrium effects, and that this policy 
induces major transfers, predominantly from consumers to owners of 
developed land. These findings extend to the case of an urban growth 
boundary.  
Bertaud and Brueckner (2005) consider the social costs of restrictions on 
building height also in the framework of a monocentric city. They apply this 
analysis to the city of Bangalore, India, where a cap exists on the ratio of a 
building’s total floor area to the area of the land parcel on which it sits. Again 
the authors 
t in general, height restrictions increase a city’s ‘footprint’ - the total area 
of land it occupies - and that for each household in the city, the welfare loss 
is equal to the extra commuting costs that a household at the urban fringe 
incurs. Their model indicates that lifting the height restrictions in Bangalore 
would reduce city size by about 17 per cent, and that the cost saving would 
range from 1.5 per cent to 4.5 per cent of household income, depending on 
the specific assumptions about urban form. The same framework could be 
applied to the minimum lot size zoning policies that enjoy significant 
popularity in the US.  
 
THE EVIDENCE ON NET WELFARE EFFECTS 
To the best of our knowledge, Cheshire and Sheppard (2002) were the first to 
provide a comprehensiv
estimates from earlier work on the Reading housing ma
subsection which provides a simple economic framewor
analysis, coupled with data on the incomes and demographic composition of 
the households to estimate the structure of demand for both private 
residential land and planning produced amenities such as open space, as a 
function of prices and household income. More specifically, the planning 
induced amenities that contribute to household utility in their model are the 
share of land in a square kilometre around the house that is used for either 
accessible or inaccessible open space and the share of land that is not in 
industrial use. This demand system is integrated in a monocentric urban 
economic model, which is calibrated to various data sources for the Reading 
housing market.  
Since both costs and benefits of changing the planning system operate 
through the residential land market, the authors can then use this model to 
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 this it is possible to estimate the net welfare effects of 
rel
ision 
of
ce in 
a 
estimate the trade-offs involved in producing a little more or less of the 
‘planning amenities’ and a little more or less of private space for residential 
occupation. From
axing the planning system’s constraints on land supply in various ways. 
They find that increasing the amount of residential land within the city 
boundary and shifting this boundary outwards both have positive net social 
gains, although gains of the latter policy option are substantially larger. If 
Reading would be allowed to expand by 70 per cent of its total surface, the 
estimated net welfare gain would amount to almost 4 per cent of household 
income even allowing for the loss of inaccessible greenbelt land and 
accessible open space such a relaxation would entail. Nevertheless, these 
findings do not support the abolition of land use regulation altogether since 
the system did produce benefits. The problem is that it produced those 
benefits in its then current degree of restrictiveness on supply at considerably 
greater cost to the community than the value of the benefits generated.  
In the same study, Cheshire and Sheppard consider the distributional 
effects of land use regulation. This was possible because their sample 
included the precise location of the houses (and so the ‘value’ of their 
consumption of planning produced amenities) and the income of the 
households. With respect to the gross benefits, they report that the prov
 inaccessible open space – greenbelt land – tended to increase inequality; 
benefits were even more inequitably distributed than were the incomes of 
owner occupiers. The separation of industrial from residential land was 
broadly neutral in distributional terms compared to the incomes of owner 
occupiers, while the provision of accessible open space tended to reduce 
inequality. However, overall, adding all three amenities together the net 
welfare effect was almost distributionally neutral – again relative to the 
distribution of the incomes of owner occupiers. This suggests that richer 
households do not only benefit more from planning-induced amenities, but 
that they also, through the housing market, pay a higher price. The 
distributional effects through land ownership, which were the focus of 
Quigley and Swoboda (2007), were not considered explicitly here.  
The study by Rouwendal and Van der Straaten (2008), also mentioned in 
the subsection providing a simple economic framework for land use policy 
analysis, closely follows the work by Cheshire and Sheppard in various 
respects, although their prime focus was on open space within cities. In a 
stylised theoretical model, the authors show that the amount of open spa
neighbourhood is optimal when the total benefits of increasing it by one 
unit are equal to the local price of residential land. Applying this cost-benefit 
rule to three Dutch cities, they find that the share of land in open space is too 
high in Amsterdam, too low in The Hague and approximately optimal in 
Rotterdam. The similarity in the specification of land use externalities 
suggests that the same first-best policy rule would apply equally in the 
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ich is calibrated to data from Wake County in North Carolina, 
US
 welfare analysis of greenbelts, considered as a 
mu
                                                          
Cheshire and Sheppard model. Since the local provision of open space 
renders urban growth boundaries superfluous in such an ideal setting, it is not 
surprising that relaxing growth restrictions in Reading was found to be so 
beneficial.  
Walsh (2007) assumes that not only the share of open space in a 
neighbourhood enters household utility, but also the distance to the nearest 
parcel of publicly held open space, as in Anderson and West (2006). This 
specification of demand is incorporated into a general equilibrium model of 
land use, wh
A. As in Quigley and Swoboda (2007), an important message of this paper 
is the likely existence of a gap between partial and general equilibrium 
evaluations of land use regulation, because the preservation of land use in 
one location may induce urban expansion and loss of open space at other 
places. The author even finds that through endogenous adjustments in 
privately held open space, for example land in agricultural use, increases in 
the quantity of land in public preserves may lead to a decrease in the total 
amount of open space in the metropolitan area. Amongst the policy scenarios 
that are considered, the public acquisition of land or development rights in 
the more densely populated parts of the county appears to be the most 
beneficial, while the imposition of an urban growth boundary is found to be 
particularly costly.  
A small number of studies analyse the costs and benefits of greenbelts or 
urban growth boundaries within urban equilibrium models that rely more 
heavily on theory, with a sensible choice of key parameters constituting their 
main empirical foundation. Lee and Fujita (1999) provide a useful theoretical 
framework for the
ltifunctional park that provides citizens with recreational areas, 
environmental amenities and scenic views.18 The authors show that if the 
enjoyment of at least some of these public goods declines with distance, the 
imposition of a greenbelt that imposes binding restrictions on residential 
development is socially desirable, although leapfrogging development at its 
outer fringe should be allowed under certain conditions. Similarly, Brueckner 
(1990) and Engle et al. (1992) propose a theoretical framework in which 
urban growth boundaries may be socially desirable, as negative externalities 
increase with of the number of people in a city because of congestion, 
pollution or crime. It should be realised that the externalities or public goods 
in these latter models affect all residents in the same way, so their impact 
would not identifiable via variations in local house prices.  
Both Bento et al. (2006) and Cheshire and Sheppard (2003) have analysed 
the efficiency and distributional impacts of alternative anti-sprawl policies, 
18 On the realism of these assumptions, see our discussion at the outset of section 3.1.  
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such policies and 
se
s of land near the CBD. To 
ow
of city size. Their model was calibrated to the Dutch capital of 
Am
coming to rather different conclusions. Bento et al. assumed that households 
value the amount of open space that is preserved through 
t parameters so that their numerical model resembled a typical US city, 
although the parameter for the valuation of open space was chosen arbitrarily. 
In terms of efficiency, both an urban growth boundary and a tax on land 
conversion turned out to be optimal policy responses to the externality, and 
should reduce the equilibrium city size by about 12 per cent. Taxes on fuel or 
property appeared to be rather poor second-best policy alternatives, reducing 
city size by about 8 per cent and 4 per cent respectively in the constrained 
optima. Cheshire and Sheppard (2003) used the valuation of open and private 
space as estimated in their 2002 model (rather than assuming values) and 
then modelled the welfare effects of a) growth boundaries; b) fuel taxes; and 
c) a tax on the consumption of land with each tax rate selected to achieve the 
same total urban take of land as the observed urban growth boundaries in a). 
The result was that by a significant margin the most welfare effective 
mechanism was a tax on land consumption with a fuel tax being no more 
efficient in welfare terms than an urban growth boundary. This assumed, 
however, that tax revenues were converted entirely into welfare – there was 
no deadweight loss associated with collection and spending. It also did not 
evaluate the welfare impact of the growth boundary itself. It simply asked the 
question if this is the total urban area that society wants what is the least 
costly way in welfare terms of achieving it. They also took no account of 
other possible benefits associated with fuel taxes. 
Bento et al. (2006) also considered the distributional effects for land 
owners. As in Quigley and Swoboda (2007), these depended strongly on the 
location of the land. For instance, the fuel tax harmed owners of land close to 
the city fringe and the property tax harmed owner
ners of land that was not developed, the development tax was preferable to 
an urban growth boundary, because they benefit from the redistribution of tax 
revenues.  
In a welfare analysis of clustered deconcentration policies, which combine 
urban growth boundaries with accommodative policies in satellite 
communities, Vermeulen and Rouwendal (2008) consider a negative 
externality 
sterdam and a nearby town founded in the 1960s, and the parameters that 
relate to the externality were chosen such that the present level of 
restrictiveness in the main city was optimal by assumption. This required that 
on average, households spent about 10 per cent of their disposable household 
income on development taxes. Despite this, government plans to 
accommodate demographic growth mainly in the satellite city while 
maintaining tight restrictions around Amsterdam itself could not be justified 
with this externality. Furthermore, the authors showed that implementation of 
the present land use controls might impose a net welfare loss of several 
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nd use planning on 
pr s and welfare through the residential sector. By far the largest proportion 
restrictions can in 
ses. There is very 
e effect of development restrictions on the cost of office 
sp
ial development. Business property taxes are an 
im
percent of disposable household income, if the government had 
overestimated the importance of the city size externality. As in Bento et al. 
(2006), open space within cities is ignored in this paper.  
 
REGULATION OF NON-RESIDENTIAL LAND USE 
All the above evidence has related to the impacts of la
ice
of a cities occupied land is in residential use but planning 
principle have impacts on prices and welfare in other land u
little evidence here, however. Again in principle there are likely to be 
benefits and costs and to observe price increases is not necessarily to infer a 
welfare loss. If the supply of say commercial space is restricted, then there 
will be both distributional effects – owners of property allowed to (fully) 
develop will gain while owners of property unable to develop will lose. The 
costs of space will be increased and since space is an input into production 
output prices will increase and total output will fall somewhat. But there may 
also be benefits in the form of historic cityscapes preserved and the amenity 
values of cities. 
Glaeser et al. (2005) in their study of the New York housing market note 
in passing that the impacts of height (development) restrictions on office 
costs are slight. Indeed at the low point in the real estate price cycle, in 1996, 
they estimated th
ace to be zero although by the high point of the cycle, in 2002, there 
appeared to be some small effect – equivalent to a tax of perhaps 50 per cent. 
This, however, may have simply reflected a short run adjustment problem 
since expansion of the stock of office space in the face of a rapid increase in 
demand is difficult.  
However, as has already been noted, European governments are less wary 
of regulating markets than is the case in the USA and the local fiscal system 
in the USA provides a very strong incentive to local communities to 
encourage commerc
portant source of net revenues to local governments – business property 
creates more tax revenues than it costs local communities to service. Again 
these conditions are not uniformly found in Europe where in some countries 
such as the UK business property taxes are entirely a national tax providing 
no direct revenues to local communities at all despite the legal obligation 
local communities have to provide services for businesses. Thus in effect the 
fiscal incentive is entirely reversed. Local communities are fined for allowing 
any development at all. 
It is against that background that the figures in Table 6.2 should be 
interpreted. These derive from Cheshire and Hilber (2008) – the first study to 
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ross costs as Glaeser et al. (2005) – the so-called 
‘re
than in the City of London, London’s Docklands or 
Ta
have planning impacts on commercial property as its main focus. They used 
the same measure of the g
gulatory tax’ (RT): that is the difference between the costs of building an 
additional unit of space and the price of that space (see also our discussion in 
the section providing a simple economic framework for land use policy 
analysis). In the Cheshire and Hilber study however, this is expressed as a 
‘tax rate’ on costs. Thus the value reported for London West End offices as 
the average 1999-2005 means that the excess of the price of space over its 
costs of construction was estimated as being equivalent to a 809 per cent tax 
on constructions costs. 
It is obvious that the gross costs of regulation in European centres is far 
higher than in the US and far higher in Britain than in nearly all Continental 
European cities. It is not surprising to find a higher cost in London’s West 
End or the City of Paris 
ble 6.2  Estimated regulatory tax (RT) for UK office markets and selected 
European cities. The regulatory tax is expressed as a percentage of marginal 
construction costs 
 
City 
Estimated Regulatory Tax Rate 
(RT) 
UK Markets 1999 2005 
Average 
1999-2005 
London West End 9.18 8.89 8.09 
City of London 6.41 
Canary Whar 2
ith 
 Tyne 
ad 
3.34 4.88 
f 3.43 .77 3.27 
London Hammersm 2.77 1.82 2.19 
Manchester 2.71 2.50 2.30 
Newcastle upon 1.06 1.19 0.97 
Croydon 1.18 0.99 0.94 
Edinburgh 3.11 2.62 2.91 
Glasgow 2.33 2.05 2.04 
Maidenhe 3.72 2.27 2.70 
Reading 2.71 1.61 2.03 
Bristol 1.53 1.96 1.57 
Birmingham 2.59 2.68 2.50 
Leeds 2.15 2.17 1.93 
Urban Land Markets 
 
186 
pean Cities   
A e  
19 05 Selected Euro 1999 2005
verag
99-20
London West End 7.62 8.37 8.00 
City of London 4.68 4.31 
3
4.49 
4.37 Frankfurt 5.44 .31 
Stockholm 4.28 3.30 3.79 
Milan 2.07 4.11 3.09 
Paris: City 
dam 
fense 
d on Glaeser et al., 
2005
  
 
bo ) 
  
(cyc ak)
2.35 3.75 3.05 
Barcelona 2.23 3.16 2.69 
Amster 2.12 1.92 2.02 
Paris: La Dé 1.41 1.93 1.67 
Brussels 0.52 0.84 0.68 
United States (base
) 
1996
(cycle
ttom
2000
le pe  
Manhattan (New York City)  0 0.50  
Source: for details of how these values wer
(2008). 
e ted se ire & Hilber 
 
La
no
European  very flexible planning controls) deserve much lower 
vels of restriction than London Docklands or even Birmingham. The gross 
f institutional arrangements, form and 
restrictiveness in which land use regulations are applied all over the world 
mmarise their effects on housing markets and 
cts and figures. In some cases, regulations on land use 
 calcula e Chesh
 Défense. Amenity values are higher in such locations. Nevertheless it is 
t clear why Amsterdam or Brussels (Belgium is well know for having by 
standards
le
costs for many of these cities suggest that there is a least a case to answer. 
Are the costs being imposed on office users generating even remotely 
matching benefits for society? 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The wide range in terms o
make it impossible to su
welfare in a few key fa
appear to exist merely pro forma and no impact whatsoever can be 
empirically identified, while planning-induced discontinuities in land prices 
have been described as ‘grotesque’ in cases at the other extreme. Clearly, 
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it was ignored by most 
ec
 only 2.3% of 
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la e 
a al indirect effects. While we have provided a rather extensive survey 
of
m a cleared 
sit
                                                          
land use regulation that does not impose binding restrictions neither generates 
benefits to society nor imposes costs, but in places where planning holds a 
strong grip on housing supply and urban form, adverse welfare effects have 
been found to be substantial, sometimes even amounting to several 
percentage points of household income. Less is known about the impacts of 
planning on costs of space for economic activities although again, what 
evidence there is, suggests these can be substantial. 
As we have emphasised throughout this chapter, there is still a lot of 
research to be done, and the evidence on net welfare effects of land use 
regulation is particularly scarce. Illustrating the discrepancy between the 
importance of the topic and the extent to which 
onomists, Cheshire and Sheppard (2004) observed that:  
In the US 32.4% of consumer expenditures are on housing generally, with 18.7% 
(virtually the same as the 18.5% in the UK) of expenditures specifically for 
shelter. This is about three times the expenditure on all fuels, utilities and public 
services combined. Telecommunication services comprise
household expenditures, yet regulation of such services receives much more 
attention from economists; in economics journals telephone regulation alone is the 
subject of about three times as many papers as land market regulation (p. 619-
620).  
It is therefore not surprising that the literature has hardly come to grips yet
ith the fact that over and above the welfare effects that operate via urban 
nd and housing markets, binding land use regulation is likely hav
ddition
 the existing evidence on the former type of welfare effects in this chapter, 
we conclude by sketching a number of these wider consequences, as some of 
them are likely to be important for aggregate welfare and policy.  
To begin with, the paper work that comes with residential development in 
a regulated urban land market imposes a ‘fixed cost’. Whoever bears that 
cost, and it is likely to be mainly negatively capitalised into land prices, it 
does cost real resources. It is reported in Shanghai that getting fro
e to a saleable building requires a total of more than 130 permits, licences 
and permissions.19 It is easier to carry such costs in large development 
projects and large developers that have more experience with the bureaucratic 
processes. Hence, a barrier to the entry of new and small firms in the industry 
may be imposed, so that competition is restricted. Furthermore, as illustrated 
in Figures 6.3 and 6.5, development in urban land markets that are directly 
regulated may generate substantial ‘scarcity rents’ which become available 
once development is permitted. Would-be developers and others attempting 
to capture a share of these scarcity rents spend resources. At one extreme this 
may just lead to wasteful expenditures on advocates, glossy brochures, and 
19 Private communication from a Chinese developer. 
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luxurious trips with people who make planning decisions; at the other it can 
lead to large scale corruption damaging the capacity of public administration. 
The Italian research institute CENSIS (CENSIS, 1985) estimated that more 
than 2.7 million illegal homes were built in Italy between 1971 and 1984. 
That was more than 50 percent of all homes built over that period and 
constituted in 1985 12.3 percent of the total stock of homes in Italy.  
Anticompetitive effects may extend indirectly to other sectors by 
restricting entry. In this respect the retail sector has been much discussed 
because restrictions on the supply of land for shops may lead to market 
power for the existing retailers in a local area (Competition Com
08). Just the same happens to the price of beer if the planners restrict the 
number of pubs in a neighbourhood. In Oxford, England, the local planning 
system determined that the community ‘did not need any more Estate 
Agents’. The established local Estate Agents were the sole beneficiaries of 
this restriction.  
Furthermore, planning may inhibit the development of ‘big box’ retail 
shops at the urban fringe, in which the exploitation of economies of scale 
may lead to significantly higher productivity levels. Gordon (2004) argues 
that this type o
ference in aggregate productivity growth between the USA and Europe 
over the past decade. This measure obviously does not reflect any benefits 
that people may derive from having more small local shops in their 
residential area and less development on land at the edge of cities. But this 
benefit comes at the unrecognised and unquantified expense of higher prices 
in the shops and more frequent, smaller, shopping trips.  
Other important indirect effects of land use regulation may derive from its 
potential repercussions on regional labour markets. As shown for the USA by 
Glaeser et al. (2006), regulation that restricts housing supply in an urban area 
may also restrict the number of workers and hence j
shes up house prices and wages.20 In turn, the full benefit of economies of 
agglomeration may not be reaped, so that labour productivity growth is 
hampered throughout the economy. This also appears to be relevant in the 
Randstad area in the west of the Netherlands – one of the most densely 
populated metropolitan areas of the OECD – where job growth in the past 
decades has been lower than in surrounding regions as a consequence of land 
use planning (Vermeulen and Van Ommeren, 2008). In line with the 
argument of foregone economies of agglomeration, the OECD (2007) pointed 
to lagging labour productivity growth in this area relative to other 
metropolitan areas, partly as a consequence of rigidities in housing markets. 
20 The same mechanism holds equally for cities that compete on international labour 
markets, who may find it more difficult to attract highly skilled workers as housing 
gets more expensive.  
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Nevertheless, with the notable exception of Rossi-Hansberg (2004), hardly 
any theoretical or empirical work on the relationship between land use 
regulation and economies of agglomeration exists.  
As housing dominates the budget of most households, land use regulation 
that raises prices is likely to affect more macroeconomic outcomes than just 
the productivity of labour. For instance, high house prices make each dollar 
earned less valuable, so that restrictive planning re
pply labour. Furthermore, housing being the dominant asset in most 
households’ portfolios, there are also repercussions on saving, investment 
and consumption choices. Most households are not able to adequately 
diversify the uncertainty about asset returns of housing, and land use 
regulation may not only push up the share of housing in their portfolios, but 
also the degree of uncertainty about its returns. Since these returns may be 
spent in turn on consumption, this enhances macroeconomic volatility and 
risk, as has been extensively discussed in Barker (2003, 2004) at the time that 
the UK considered entry into the Euro area (see also OECD, 2004).  
Finally, the fact that housing features so prominently in the portfolio of 
owner-occupiers, and that the risk associated with this is hard to diversify, 
opens up a range of issues within the field of political economy. For instance, 
it implies that older generations who already own a house have an i
limit new construction, as this will raise their asset gains. For essentially 
the same reason, it implies that homeowners have an incentive to limit new 
construction in their local neighbourhoods, the NIMBY behaviour that we 
have briefly discussed in the previous section. This may be particularly 
problematic if voting for land use regulation occurs at the local level, where 
its costs are most strongly experienced and bear particularly heavily on small 
numbers of voters, while the benefits of new development accrue to people in 
a wider area (who have no votes in the decision making process).21 Such 
considerations may lead to policies that deviate from optimal planning, and 
as we have amply discussed throughout this chapter, the costs this imposes 
on society may be large. Hence, next to its welfare economic aspects, the 
political economy of land use regulation is another field in which progress 
should be made, in order to understand not only the consequences but also 
the causes of the restrictive planning of land use that is presently gaining 
popularity in various parts of the world.  
21 Moreover, even if voting occurs at a higher regional level, this type behaviour may 
still be influential through local lobby groups. If the costs of residential development 
fall on a small group of people, it is worthwhile for them to lobby and the transactions 
costs of forming lobbying groups are lower than for the large group of people each 
receiving only a small benefits.  This is likely to be true even when the combined 
value of the many small benefits substantially exceeds that of the relatively few large 
costs. 
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